Most destructive attack strategies for networks

报告题目：Most destructive attack strategies for networks
报告人：Piet Van Mieghem 博士/教授（荷兰代尔夫特理工大学）
报告时间：4月27日，上午10:00
报告地点：为民楼320会议室  

专家简介：Piet Van Mieghem is professor at the Delft University of Technology with a chair in telecommunication networks and chairman of the section Network Architectures and Services (NAS) since 1998. His main research interests lie in the modelling and analysis of complex networks (such as infrastructural, biological, brain, social networks) and in new Internet-like architectures and algorithms for future communications networks.
He is the author of four books: Performance Analysis of Communications Networks and Systems, Data Communications Networking, Graph Spectra for Complex Networks and Performance Analysis of Complex Networks and Systems.
Currently, he serves on the editorial board of the OUP Journal of Complex Networks.
Professor Van Mieghem received a Master and Ph. D. degree in Electrical Engineering from the K.U.Leuven (Belgium) in 1987 and 1991, respectively. Before joining Delft, he worked at the Interuniversity Micro Electronic Center (IMEC) from 1987 to 1991. During 1993 to 1998, he was a member of the Alcatel Corporate Research Center in Antwerp where he was engaged in performance analysis of ATM systems and in network architectural concepts of both ATM networks (PNNI) and the Internet. He was a visiting scientist at MIT (department of Electrical Engineering, 1992-1993) and a visiting professor at UCLA (department of Electrical Engineering, 2005), at Cornell University (Center of Applied Mathematics, 2009) and at Stanford University (department of Electrical Engineering, 2015).
He was member of the editorial board of Computer Networks (2005-2006), the IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (2008-2012), the Journal of Discrete Mathematics (2012-2014) and Computer Communications (2012-2015).

报告摘要：The failures of multiple elements in a network can have disastrous consequences on its operation. Thus, understanding the network robustness under multiple failure contingencies is essential. We analyse the robustness of real-world networks to multiple failures caused by malicious attacks. In 52 real-world networks of three infrastructures (telecommunication networks, power grids and metro networks), we analyse the effect of targeted-node-removals on the robustness of the network. First, we investigate the size of the giant component of a network after targeted node removals according to traditional centrality metrics (such as degree, betweenness, closeness, principal adjacency matrix eigenvector) and the recently proposed "zetavector" with the diagonal elements of the pseudoinverse of the Laplacian. Subsequently, we compare and rank those node-removal strategies in the selected set of real-world infrastructures.